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The discussion of presidential mandates is as certain as a presidential election itself.  Journalists inevitably discuss 
whether the president-elect has a popular mandate.  Because they see elections as too complex to allow the public to 
send a unitary signal, political scientists are more skeptical of mandates.  Mandates, however, have received new 
attention by scholars asking whether perceptions of mandate arise and lead representatives to act as if voters sent a 
policy directive.  Two explanations have emerged to account for why elected officials might react to such 
perceptions.  One focuses on the President’s strategic decision to declare a mandate, the second on how members of 
Congress read signals of changing preferences in the electorate from their own election results.  We test these 
competing views to see which more accurately explains how members of Congress act in support of a perceived 
mandate.  The results indicate that members respond more to messages about changing preferences than to the 
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Scholars for decades have thought of electoral mandates as the intention by voters to use their 
votes to send a message about their policy preferences.  A second question has emerged more 
recently: Do politicians receive messages about voter intention -- perhaps even some never 
consciously sent by voters -- and then act on them?  If so, then the behavioral consequences of 
perceiving a message in an election are quite real, whatever was or was not in the minds of 
voters.  Those behavioral consequences have now been demonstrated (Peterson et al. 2003).  
There remains a question unresolved: From where do the perceptions arise?  We consider two 
leading -- and conflicting -- possibilities, (1) that mandates are generated by presidents to serve 
their strategic needs, and (2) that members of Congress respond instead to evidence they have 
personally witnessed and, in particular, the evidence of their own electoral experiences and those 
of colleagues. 
The initial question asked of mandates centers on their existence and has intrigued 
scholars for decades (Dahl 1990; Edwards 1989; Fiorina 1989; Hershey 1994; Kelley 1983; 
Stimson 1999; Weinbaum and Judd 1970; and Wolfinger 1985).  The standard question, 
typically asked is “Do mandates exist?  Can one find a directive for policy change in presidential 
election results?”  The standard answer is no.  Voters are too uninformed, unopinionated, and 
uninvolved for there to be a clear policy signal.  Given the large number of issues in the 
campaign and the single choice between two candidates, it is virtually impossible to determine 
the issue or issues unequivocally responsible for victory.  Despite scholarly skepticism, however, 
popular commentators on politics continue to discuss mandates as if they did exist. 
Given the difficulty and importance of the mandate concept, several scholars have attempted to 
reconceptualize it.  Edwards (1989) argues that scholars should turn their attention from whether 
or not a mandate exists to whether or not a perception of a mandate exists.  “[p]erceptions,” he 
argues, “are often more important than reality, because it is how political elites interpret the 
presidential vote that affects how they respond to the president and his proposals” (148, 1989).  
The question that remains is where do these perceptions come from.   
Two recent works offer differing sources of these mandate perceptions.  Conley (2001) develops 
a “President Driven” model of mandates (our term).  She argues that a president’s claim to a 
mandate is an element of a strategic interaction between the president and Congress.  The 
president is likely to claim a mandate, and Congress is likely to act as if there is one, when either 
the president is popular or the president is unpopular but Congress’ preferences are in line with 
the president’s.  Members of Congress, then, react to these perceptions of mandate elections 
because they fear retribution from a popular president. 
In Peterson, Grossback, Stimson, and Gangl (2003), we develop a separate “Public Driven” 
model of mandates.  We demonstrate that members of Congress use election results and elite 
interpretation of the results in the media as signals about the changing preferences of their 
constituents.  Mandate elections (in our previous work, the contests of 1964, 1980, and 1994) 
serve as clear messages that public opinion has moved and that this movement has electoral 
consequence.  The social construction of election interpretation, primarily within the Washington 
community, drives elite perceptions of a mandate.  The interpretation centers on the perceived 
state of public opinion.  Mandates, according to the Public Driven model, are unambiguous 
messages that the preference of the country has moved.  Members of Congress react because 
they share the view that public opinion has made a dramatic (and unexpected) move in one 
direction. 
The two explanations thus suggest that members of Congress respond to different stimuli.  In 
Conley’s theory, members of Congress respond to the president.  If the president is popular and 
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claims a mandate, then Congress will adopt the president’s policy regardless of the state of 
public opinion.  In our theory, members of Congress respond to perceived changes in public 
opinion.  If members of Congress see a shift in their constituents’ preferences, they will adopt 
policies to reflect these changes regardless of the popularity of the president.  These are very 
different views of congressional responsiveness.  In the President Driven model, Congress 
capitulates to the mandated president, almost abdicating its role in the separation of powers.1  In 
the Public Driven model, Congress acts as a representative body, rapidly reflecting the policy 
preferences of the voters. 
In this article, we develop a test of both explanations to see which better accounts for the 
observable patterns of mandate reactions in Congress.  Because both works are limited in the 
strength of their conclusions, we extend both theories to new areas.  Conley’s theory relies on the 
institutional balance between the president and Congress.  Her empirical test, however, focuses 
on presidential action and not the reaction of Congress.  In Peterson et al., we focus our analyses 
only on the years declared as mandates.  While that decision is appropriate for the research 
question of that article, one cannot look solely at positive cases to explain why elections are 
interpreted as mandates.  Here we extend both works (1) by offering a first test of several claims 
from each model and (2) by extending the test to all national elections -- observing mandate 
reaction both where the claim of a mandate might be believed and where it is not. 
Congressional Response to Mandates 
It is important to be clear about what we mean by mandates.  Most scholarly work on the topic 
addresses their presence or absence (or possibility or impossibility) in elections.  Instead, we are 
focusing on the elite interpretation of, and reaction to, elections.  The central question addressed 
is, what leads members of Congress to interpret an election as carrying a mandate?  It is a 
fundamentally different approach than asking if one occurred, but an approach that is becoming 
more common.  The earlier voting behavior research regarded the mandate as a mental state of 
voters.  The issue was whether or not they consciously shaped their votes to send a message 
about preferred policies.  How and whether that message is received are questions beyond the 
scope of that scholarship.  The newer research, which we build upon, addresses the question of 
reaction to the electoral message.  If the reaction is real, i.e., observed in behavior, then no matter 
the intent of the voters, a mandate, (albeit of a new form), has occurred. 
The two existing theories explaining how elites respond to mandate signals offer different 
pictures of American politics.  In the President Driven model, the interpretation of the election 
centers on the amount of support for the president’s agenda.  In it, elites ask whether the election 
signals that the president has the overwhelming support of the public.  The focus is on how 
members of Congress perceive election results as signals of presidential influence.  If the 
election signal implies that the president is popular, then Congress passes the president’s 
policies.  If the election does not support the perception of a popular president, then Congress 
follows its own course. 
The Public Driven model suggests that members of Congress see elections as signals of changes 
in public opinion.  Elections, if one-sided, may serve as unambiguous signals of the preferences 
                                                 
1 Dahl (1990) asserts that the presidential claims to a mandate and Congress’ acceptance are at 
the heart of the growth in the power of the presidency and, for him, the breakdown of popular 
control over government.  President driven mandates, Dahl argues, unbalance the separation of 
powers and threaten government responsiveness to public opinion.   
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of the voters for a more conservative or liberal government.  Members of Congress who wish to 
be reelected adjust their policy positions to reflect the new perception of public opinion. 
The Public Driven account differs from the President Driven model in three ways.  First, the 
models differ fundamentally in the character of the reelection concerns of members of Congress.  
In the President Driven model, members of Congress fear resisting a popular president.  In the 
Public Driven model, members of Congress fear being out of touch with the preferences of their 
constituents.  While these two are often synonymous, they need not be.  In 1984, for instance, 
Ronald Reagan’s landslide reelection signaled a very popular president.  It did not, however, 
send a signal of a move to the right by the American electorate.2  Second, the Public Driven 
model centers on members’ own electoral interests, not on their relationship to the White House.  
While the popularity of the president may matter in this calculation, it matters only if the 
president can use his public standing to affect the next election.  Third, the Public Driven account 
centers on change in perceptions about public opinion.  In Conley’s theory, a president being re-
elected by a large margin should carry a mandate.  In the Public Driven model, members of 
Congress are likely to have already incorporated the president’s public standing into their voting 
patterns before the election.  Richard Nixon’s landslide in 1972, for example, provided little new 
information to members of Congress.  Members (and everyone else) knew that Nixon was 
popular, at least relative to his opponents, and the expected election outcome should not have led 
them to alter that perception. 
The Elements of a Mandate Reaction 
Our comparison of the President Driven and Public Driven models of mandates begins with what 
we believe is the common ground.  First, mandates are about elections.  While this seems 
obvious, it nonetheless provides a starting point of a test.  It implies that the best place to look for 
responses to the mandates is in the immediate aftermath—the start of the newly elected 
Congress. 
The fact that mandates center around elections implies a second commonality.  There can be only 
one winner.  It makes no sense for there to be a mandate for both the right and the left, or both 
for and against the president.  Thus, if we are looking for evidence of a reaction to a mandate, we 
know in which direction this reaction should be.  For presidential elections, the party of the 
victorious candidate is the party that can more reasonably claim a mandate.  For off-year 
elections, the party that gained the most seats in Congress has the stronger claim to a mandate.3 
A third commonality is that both theories hold that mandates are about policy.  What separates a 
mandate from a non-mandate is the policy message that is included in the election results.  In the 
President Driven model, the president’s strategic claim of a mandate is an attempt to get 
Congress to adopt his policy agenda.  In the Public Driven model, the elections are a mandate 
when the interpretation of election returns sends a signal about the changing policy preferences 
of the electorate.  In both cases, the force behind the mandate is a call for policy change. 
Both theories suggest finally that members of Congress react to mandate claims.  Conley argues 
that when a president successfully claims a mandate (successful in that Congress accedes to the 
president’s views), Congress will agree with his proposal, change roll call voting patterns, and 
adopt the president’s policies.  Her argument is actually more substantial, suggesting that a 
                                                 
2 In fact, the electorate moved significantly to the left during Reagan’s first term (Stimson 1999). 
3  The one troublesome case is 1962 where the Democrats lost 4 seats in the House and gained 4 
in the Senate.  Because we have to declare a direction for our test and because the House loss 
was unusually small for a midterm election, we code this as a Democratic victory. 
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mandate interpretation of an election “affects how members of Congress construct their policy 
agendas, committee preferences, staffs, and provisions of constituency services” (2001 p. 7).  
Electoral interpretations shape every action taken by a member of Congress.  If the interpretation 
supports a mandate claim, then he or she will deviate from normal actions to adapt to the new 
understanding of politics.  While Conley’s empirical work focuses on presidential claims of 
mandates, she does test congressional reactions, linking the claim of a mandate to changes in 
presidential support in the year following the election. 
We are more explicit in our expectations of congressional reaction.  If a member of Congress 
perceives change in constituent preferences, then that member should react by altering his or her 
votes.  Assuming that member voting strategies are a compromise between electoral expediency 
(perhaps the moderate views of the median constituent) and members’ own (and primary 
electorate’s) more extreme views, members of the party favored by the mandate should be 
emboldened and become more extreme.  Members of the disadvantaged party should be 
threatened and moderate their roll call votes.  In both theories, if a member of Congress 
perceives a mandate, the member’s voting should be different from when there is no such 
perception. 
We now have the makings for a comparative test of both theories.  Both theories expect members 
of Congress (1) to vote for policy that they would not have otherwise supported, (2) at the start 
of the session following the election, and (3) with the direction of this change in voting favoring 
the party presumed to have won the mandate.  Thus, we have the basis for a measurement 
strategy of presumed mandate reactions. 
Measuring Congressional Reactions to a Mandate 
Our measurement approach is the same used in Peterson et al. (2003).  The procedure has three 
steps.  First, we categorize every vote as liberal, conservative, or non-ideological based on the 
mean ADA score of the members of Congress voting “yea” and “nay.”  If the split between the 
average ADA scores of “yeas” and “nays” is less than 30 points, the vote is treated as non-
ideological and omitted from the analysis.  Second, we calculate each member’s “equilibrium 
liberalism” by taking the proportion of ideological votes cast during the first year of the session 
that are liberal.  Finally, all of the ideological roll calls are divided into blocks of ten votes.  After 
each block of ten votes, each member’s liberalism up to that point is compared to his or her 
equilibrium value.  If this running vote tally is more than one standard deviation away from the 
equilibrium, in the direction of the mandate, then the member is declared to be affected by the 
mandate.  We use the same scheme here, but instead of measuring the length of time that a 
member deviates from his or her normal voting pattern, we categorize whether or not the 
member responds to the mandate at all.  We include every congressional session since 1960.4 
While this yields a measure for every member in every session, we are initially concerned with 
the consensus view within the entire Congress as to whether or not the election was a mandate.  
Thus, our initial dependent variable is the number of members who react to a mandate at the start 
of each session.  When members deviate in the expected direction, we shall say that they “react 
to a mandate.” 
We seek to explain the aggregate number of members affected for two reasons.  First, Conley 
treats Congress as a unitary actor, thus it is a fairer test of her theory to look at a congressional 
level response.  Second, aggregating to the Congress level will rid our measure of some of the 
                                                 
4 We start at 1960 because the number of ideological roll calls in previous years is too small to 
generate reliable estimates. 
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noise in the dependent variable.  Members may deviate from their normal voting pattern for 
reasons other than a perceived mandate.  We expect these deviations to be idiosyncratic and thus 
generally random across years.  By aggregating, we minimize the randomness, leaving only 
meaningful responses in years in which many members respond in the same direction. 
The result of this coding process is reported in Table 1.  The first column lists the party that has a 
stronger claim to a mandate for each election based on the criteria above.  The next two columns 
report the count of members who demonstrate mandate voting behavior for the House and Senate 
respectively.  The fourth column indicates the total number of members affected by the mandate, 
the phenomenon to be explained in the first set of analyses. 
[Table 1 here] 
While the Congress level measure allows for a direct test of the two theories, the individual level 
data provides a better test of the broader arguments.  The Congress level data could be the result 
of two processes.  These data could be the result of national level interpretations of elections and 
assessments of presidential standing with the public.  They could also represent the aggregation 
of 535 individual members responding to signals sent by their own individual constituencies.  
Both theories of mandate suggest that a national level message drives the process, not individual 
members’ election results.  We use the individual level data on members of Congress, then, to 
see if the national factors will change the likelihood that a member will react even after 
controlling for individual level predictors of this behavior. 
What Drives Congressional Reactions? 
What conditions induce change in congressional behavior?  Every president (and every majority 
party in Congress) would like to be able to claim a policy mandate from the electorate.  At the 
same time, the defeated party has an incentive to deny the existence of a mandate.  While these 
interpretations are open for political debate, there are certain facts that may enhance or dampen 
the persuasiveness of the mandate claim.  The two theories offer different explanations for the 
variation in mandate effects across years, differences that allow for a clear comparison. 
The next two sections of the paper develop the empirical implications of each model.  Given the 
number of hypotheses developed, we look at each model in turn.  We first discuss each model’s 
main predictions and test them individually in a bivariate framework to emphasize the support 
for each hypothesis in turn.  We then turn to a multivariate test of the individual theories.  We 
conclude our look at the aggregate data by estimating a single model that combines the 
predictors from both theories.5 
President Driven 
According to Conley, mandates are important because of their role in the strategic interaction 
between the Congress and the president.  Presidential decisions to claim a mandate are “strategic 
calculations based on expectations about congressional responses to the president’s initiative and 
on forecasts about voter reactions in the future” (Conley 2001, p. 6).  While the president has an 
                                                 
5 There is also a potential regional difference—members from the South may interpret and react 
to elections differently during presidential elections during the issue evolution on race (Carmines 
and Stimson 1989).  We have attempted to uncover a regional pattern in these results and adding 
whether or not the member was from the South does not improve the model.  This should not be 
surprising since the issue evolution on race was not a regional change, but a change that affected 
every portion of America (Carmines and Stimson 1989).   
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incentive to claim a mandate, members of Congress in the opposing party have an incentive to 
resist such claims.  Assuming that there is a cost to claiming a mandate, and an even greater cost 
to having Congress reject the claim, the president should claim a mandate only if he or she can 
get Congress to agree.  Members of Congress, it follows, should accept the claim of a mandate if 
either (a) they agree with the policy preferences of the president (i.e., are of his party) or (b) 
think that the opposition party will lose when the president takes the claim to the voters. 
Conley provides evidence in support of these claims.  She finds that presidents are likely to 
declare a mandate when their support is high (they win by a landslide), when they are of the 
majority party within the party system, and when opposition in Congress is expected to be low.  
It appears, then, that presidents follow this reasoning when making their declarations.  How 
Congress reacts remains untested. 
Operationalizing the President Driven Theory 
Conley’s theory suggests three explanatory variables for a model of congressional response.  The 
first is the president’s margin of victory.  The larger the new president’s victory, the stronger is 
the claim to a mandate.  A new president will have a more difficult time selling a close election, 
or one where he receives less then fifty percent of the popular vote, as a mandate for change.  In 
the analyses that follow, this is operationalized as the difference between the percent of the 
popular vote the victor won, minus the percent won by losing major party.6  We expect a positive 
relationship, the larger the margin of victory the greater the number of members who will act as 
if a mandate exists.  A bivariate test does not support the theory.  The relationship is negative (-
3.12), and nonsignificant (p>0.25).7 
Conley’s second expectation is that a president will be more likely to claim a mandate if he is of 
the majority party in the electorate (because he is more likely to win the backing of the public).  
Given our reading of the aggregate level partisanship of the electorate, we interpret the majority 
party as the Democratic Party for the entire period studied here (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 
2002).8  The expectation of Conley’s model is that if the mandate party is the majority party, 
Congress should be more likely to respond out of the fear that the president will gain power if he 
goes public with his agenda.  Thus, the indicator of majority party status should be positively 
related to the number of members affected.  It is not.  The coefficient is negative (-17.71) though 
insignificant (p>0.57). 
The third hypothesis is that the president should claim a mandate despite only moderate support 
from the public so long as he has the support of Congress.  Moderate public support is defined as 
those instances where the president receives less than fifty percent in the presidential election 
(the criterion used by Conley), and congressional support is the number of chambers controlled 
by the president’s party.  Because the expectation is conditional and congressional support 
matters only when electoral support is moderate, our measure is an interaction between the 
number of chambers controlled and a dummy indicating whether the president received less than 
a majority of the popular vote.  This coefficient should be positively related to the number of 
members affected by the mandate perception.  Again, the data do not support the President 
                                                 
6 Conley uses several measures of presidential support.  This one is best behaved in the analyses. 
7 The coefficients reported are regression coefficients.  The interpretation, then, is the change in 
the number of members affected for a one percent change in the margin of victory. 
8  Conley defines the majority party as the Democratic Party from 1960 to 1980 and the 
Republican Party thereafter.  The results of the test of the majority party hypothesis are the same 
regardless of the criterion chosen.    
 6
Driven model.  The coefficient on the interaction term is positive (7.89) but nonsignificant 
(p>0.84). 
Table 2 presents a multivariate test of the theory.  The model includes as explanatory variables 
the president’s margin of victory, an indicator of the president receiving less than 50% of the 
popular vote, whether or not the mandate party is the majority party, the number of chambers of 
Congress controlled by the mandate party, and an interaction between the president not receiving 
a majority and the number of chambers the party controls.9  Because this number is a count (a 
non-negative integer) the model is estimated with a Poisson regression.  Again, the expectations 
from Conley’s model are that larger margins of victory, receiving over 50% of the vote, and 
being in the majority party should boost responses to a mandate claim.  The president’s party’s 
control in Congress should matter when the president is weak.  Thus, the chamber control 
variable should be insignificant and the interaction term should be positive—control matters 
when the president is unpopular. 
[Table 2 here] 
The multivariate model offers some  support for the President Driven model, though the results 
are mixed.  The estimate tapping when the president does not receive a majority is significant 
and correctly signed.  More members of Congress react to a mandate when a president wins a 
majority of the popular vote than when he wins with a minority.  Both the margin of victory and 
the majority party indicator are significant and incorrectly signed.  In this analysis, the larger the 
margin of victory the president receives, the less likely members are to behave as if there were a 
mandate.  In addition, if it is the majority party that gains a mandate, fewer members respond to 
it.  (We demonstrate shortly that these counter-intuitive results stem from an underspecified 
model).  Finally, the interaction between a minority president and the number of chambers the 
president’s party controlled is positive and significant as expected.  The size of the coefficient, 
however, is small (0.14) compared to the main effect of being elected with a minority of the 
votes (-0.56).  In combination, this suggests that being elected with a minority of votes 
suppresses the congressional reaction.  This effect, however, is mitigated by the number of 
chambers the party of the president holds.  Thus, the evidence that mandate perceptions stem 
from a strategic interaction of the branches is mixed. 
Public Driven 
The Public Driven model of congressional reaction is based upon members’ concerns about 
reelection.  Members attend to signals from the public in an effort to balance their own policy 
preferences with those of their constituents, and thus reduce the possibility of defeat in the next 
election.  If they get a signal that the electorate has moved, they react by moving quickly in the 
same direction as the public.  Mandate elections are uniquely informative signals of change in 
the policy preferences of voters.  They combine a clear, shared interpretation of the election as a 
signal of preference change and they provide decisive evidence that the change has electoral 
implications.  Presidents matter in this model only to the extent that they are one among many 
politicians swept along by the tide of changing opinion.  However, they need not matter at all.  
What matters is that the member of Congress perceives change in the minds of the voters. 
                                                 
9 In her analyses, Conley uses the percent of seats controlled by the president’s party instead of 
the number of chambers.  An alternative model was estimated with that measurement technique 
and it performed much worse. 
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Operationalizing the Public Driven Theory 
The Public Driven theory explains the duration of individual member response to electoral 
signals following elections where a near unanimous press calls a mandate.  To make a set of 
predictions comparable to the President Driven model, we need to reformulate the research 
design to examine whether a member responds following all elections (including the large 
number of contests in which there is no press consensus of mandate).  We end up with elements 
of our original theory, but a research design that is different.  The difference is that members are 
now conditioning their response on the implications that national electoral trends may have on 
their personal electoral conditions rather than on the more direct change in personal 
circumstances. 
The Washington community’s construction of the meaning of the election is a central factor in 
the Public Driven model.  Such a consensus is found for 1980 and 1994, but for no other years in 
the brief span, 1980-1996, that we examined.  Given the importance we place on how these 
elections are perceived in the media, the obvious choice for a predictor of congressional 
reactions would be the content of the media depiction of the election.  However, the limited 
availability of electronically archived media sources (and the resulting inability to compare 
content analyses) leaves us unable to include this variable.  The lack of electronically available 
archives of media coverage prior to 1980 however, means that one cannot compare the pre-1980 
coverage to that after 1980.  If we were to limit our analyses to only the years where electronic 
archives were available, we would shrink our already small number of elections by half. 
Instead, we look to other evidence that members of Congress may have of changes in public 
opinion, most notably the signals from the election itself.  What electoral information might 
serve as a signal of changing public opinion?  We begin with a signal ignored in the President 
Driven model (and most other discussions of mandates), congressional elections.  Two aspects of 
such elections might serve as indicators of opinion change and thus influence members’ mandate 
perceptions.  The first is a change in partisan control of one of the chambers of Congress.  Given 
the importance of party control, a change in the majority in a chamber should signal a desire for 
change within the electorate.  The second indicator is the number of seats gained by the mandate 
party.  While a change in the control of a chamber may be more visible, members of Congress 
care about their own electoral fortunes.  How their colleagues fare may be a sign of what they 
can expect in the next election.  The change in control of a chamber and the number of seats 
gained by the mandate party should both be positively related to the number of members 
affected. 
Bivariate tests support both hypotheses.  Both the number of seats that change (β   = 1.65, 
p<0.05) and the change in control of a chamber (β = 94.90, p<0.05) are positively related to the 
number of members who act as if they were responding to a mandate.  The aggregate changes in 
congressional fortunes influence those members of Congress who survive the election. 
A presidential election can also signal change in voter preferences.  We again expect that both a 
change in the party in power and the size of the victory will shape the reaction of members of 
Congress.  The Public Driven theory centers on members of Congress perceiving a change in the 
ideological preference of the nation and their own constituents.  An election where a president is 
reelected, or equally where a vice president succeeds a president, will not contain the same 
message as an election where the party in office goes down to defeat.  We account for this by 
including a dummy variable that indicates a change in the party controlling the presidency.  We 
expect the coefficient to be positive—change in the party control creates perception of 
preference change, which, in turn, leads to more members affected. 
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The Public Driven model also suggests that the president’s margin of victory matters.  A larger 
margin is a stronger signal.  Unlike the President Driven model, however, the effect of the 
margin of victory should depend on whether or not there is a change in the party of the 
presidency.  In other words, Richard Nixon’s election in 1968, or Reagan’s in 1980, should have 
been a stronger message for change than either president’s reelection four years later, despite the 
much larger margins in the reelection victories.10  Thus, our analyses include a variable that 
interacts the victory margin and party change.  This, too, should be positively related to the 
number of members affected.11 
Initial tests support these hypotheses, though the situation is a bit more complex than with our 
previous results.  As noted in the discussion of the President Driven model, the margin of victory 
variable was not significant in the bivariate test.  Similarly, the change in the party of the 
president was not significant in a bivariate analysis (β= 14.93, p>0.67).  When both terms, and 
the interaction of them are included together, things change.  The main effects are both 
insignificant (β for margin of victory = -5.03, p>0.06, the change in the party of the president β = 
-54.26, p > 0.22).  The interaction term, however, is positive and significant (β= 17.59, p < 0.05).  
The initial conclusion, then, is that the margin of victory matters when the party of the president 
changes.  A change that comes with a large victory gets a sizeable reaction from members of 
Congress.  Without the change in the party of the president, the margin is irrelevant.12 
Finally, the position of the winning party in the electorate should matter in the Public Driven 
model.  Where the President Driven model sees majority status in the electorate as a factor that 
would bolster a mandate claim, the Public Driven model sees little informational value in an 
election where the majority party retains its status.  If the majority party wins, the consensus 
view of politics works; nothing has changed.  However, if the minority party wins, this can be a 
sign of changing electoral fortunes.  Thus, the two models have conflicting expectations.  If the 
Public Driven model is correct, the majority party indicator should be negatively related to 
mandate perceptions.  As reported above, the bivariate results do not support this hypothesis. 
We now turn to the multivariate model suggested by the Public Driven model of mandates.  
Again, the dependent variable is the number of members who react as would be expected if they 
had perceived a mandate.  The explanatory variables are the numbers of seats gained by the party 
that could claim a mandate, an indicator of change in control if a chamber, the president’s margin 
of victory, an indicator of change in the party of the presidency, an interaction between these last 
two, and the majority party indicator.  These results are generally supportive of the Public Driven 
model.  Both the number of seats gained by the mandate party and the change in the control of a 
chamber of Congress are positive and significant effects.  While the change in the party of the 
president is not significant, the interaction with the victory margin is positive and significant.  If 
the party of the president changes, and the vote margin is large, members react.  Interestingly, the 
                                                 
10  The key theoretical difference is the role of expectations in the Public Driven model. 
Unexpected outcomes are signals to members that their understanding of politics may be faulty.  
An expected outcome, no matter how lopsided, is in contrast a confirmation that prior 
understandings were correct, not in need of revision. 
11  It should be noted that this alters the interpretation of the “margin of victory” variable.  The 
direct margin of victory term now refers to the effect of the president’s margin of victory when 
the party of the president does not change.  
12 The effect is close to significant (p<0.06).  Given the small N (20), this conclusion may seem 
hasty.  The direction of the effect, however, fits the theory.   
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main effect of the president’s margin of victory is significant, but negative.  If the election does 
not signal a shift in public opinion as evidenced by a change in the ruling party, the president’s 
margin of victory does not induce members to support the president.  It actually is associated 
with less support of the president.  Finally, the majority party indicator remains statistically 
insignificant. 
[Table 3 here] 
To this point, we have presented parallel analyses testing the two theories.  Now we let them 
compete in the same analysis.  We conclude our aggregate analyses by estimating a full model of 
mandate reactions—one that includes the predictors for both the President Driven and Public 
Driven models.  The results in Table 4 support the Public Driven model.  None of the President 
Driven model’s main predictions is supported.  Unlike the expectation of the President Driven 
model, the effect of the president’s victory margin is conditional on whether or not the party of 
the president changes.  If the presidency changes party, the margin of victory has essentially no 
effect.  If the party does not change, the larger the margin of victory the more muted the 
reaction—the opposite of what the President Driven model suggests.  Second, the status of the 
party in the American electorate is unrelated to the congressional reaction.  The effect is positive, 
but insignificant.  Finally, while a minority president shrinks the congressional reaction, this 
effect does not depend on the standing of the president’s party in Congress. 
[Table 4 Here] 
In contrast, the Public Driven model fares well.  We have already noted the conditional effects of 
the margin of victory.  Moreover, the change in the party of the president is also significant and 
positive—if the party of the president changes, more members of Congress react as if there were 
a mandate.  Most importantly, both of the Congress measures are positive and significant.  The 
more seats the mandate party picks up, the more members react as if there were a mandate.  If 
these seat gains culminate in a change in one of the chambers of Congress, the effect is even 
stronger.  In short, the size of the congressional reaction to the election depends on the strength 
of the signal for change in both the congressional and presidential election results. 
The estimates in the second column of Table 4 present a rough picture of the effects of our 
predictors on the number of members who react to the perceived mandate.  We know the 
statistically significant predictors and we know their direction of influence.  What we do not yet 
know is how substantively important these effects are.  Fortunately, we can convert these 
coefficients to substantive effects.  The third column of Table 4 presents the expected change in 
the number of members affected when we make changes in the values of each significant 
variable and hold the remaining variable at their typical value.13  For the dichotomous variables 
(a chamber changing control, the party of the president changing, and the president being elected 
with less than 50 percent of the vote) we report the effect of a dichotomous change.  For the 
other variables, we report the effect of moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. 
All of the variables have large effects.  A change in the control of a chamber in Congress results 
in almost 19 more members supporting a mandate.  A change in the seats gained by the mandate 
party -- moving from the 25th to 75th percentile, about 45 seats-- results in 36 members changing 
their roll call voting.  A change in the party of the presidency leads to 40 members deviating 
from their equilibria at the start of the session, while a change in the president’s margin of 
victory suppresses the congressional reaction by 24 members.  Finally, if the president is elected 
                                                 
13 The expected change in the number of members affected was calculated using CLARIFY 
(King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003).   
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with less than 50 percent of the vote, the expected congressional reaction is reduced by almost 45 
members.  These are substantively important; each represents a sizable block of votes.  The 
signals of change in public opinion have the potential to change substantially the outcome of roll 
calls in the new Congress. 
Individual Level Evidence 
At this point, the evidence is supportive of the Public Driven model of mandate perceptions 
among members of Congress.  The aggregate level patterns suggest that members of Congress 
react to the signals of change in public opinion that come from the national elections.  This is one 
plausible interpretation of the results.  A second interpretation could be that the patterns observed 
so far are not the result of some national level factors, but the aggregate of 535 individual 
members reacting to their own individual election signals.  Members may not be attending to the 
national level patterns at all, but to their own election results.  If the national patterns reflect the 
individual results that members of Congress see (and if we know anything about congressional 
elections, we know that the local and national tides are often connected), then what we may be 
uncovering here is not the reactions to mandate elections, but individual members of Congress 
responding to their own constituents.  With these coarse aggregate counts of the numbers of 
members affected by a mandate, we cannot assess these competing interpretations.  A micro-
level analysis permits such an assessment. 
We now ask whether the national factors contribute to the explanation of who responds as if a 
mandate occurred once we include relevant individual level predictors.  If national factors 
continue to matter, then the patterns we observe are not merely the aggregation of individual 
level patterns, but are indicative of members of Congress responding to a national signal -- and 
implicitly to national media -- about the state of public opinion.  The key, then, is to identify the 
relevant individual level predictors.  To do that, we return to our previous work. 
The key individual variables reflect the strength of the signal that members receive and the 
necessity for the member to respond.  Change in the member’s margin of victory is central our 
theory.  If members are responding to their own districts, then national election interpretations 
are superfluous.  And if a member were merely responding to his or her constituents, and not the 
nation, then we would expect to see that only district-level election results matter.  Our theory 
points to asymmetry between losses and gains.  Stable outcomes confirm the member strategic 
understanding and should produce continuity.  Gains present an opportunity to take a more 
extreme stand for the advantaged side, but also tend to reassure the member about electoral 
strategy.  Losses are disconfirming, a warning to the surviving member that future elections also 
may pose electoral hazards.  Losses (of any size) demand changed behavior.  Thus we model 
these effects by including separate measures indicating the size of the loss or gain for the 
individual member. 
Member ideology informs us about the necessity for change.  Members perched near the middle 
of the ideological spectrum tend to represent closely divided districts that are sensitive to 
member voting records and hard to hold. We expect strong responses from them. More extreme 
members tend to represent districts that are safe for their party and present records so far from 
moderation as to make the attempt to moderate useless.  Thus, we include the ideological 
extremity of the member, coded as the absolute value of the folded ADA score (|ADA - 50|), 
expecting a negative relationship. 
Seniority, we have argued, should insulate members from the over-interpretation that is common 
for one-sided elections.  They have seen it before.  Our analyses, however, have usually not 
supported this expectation.  And it is natural also to control for party, given its central role in 
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roll-call voting, even though we have no prior expectation on which party, advantaged or 
disadvantaged, is likely to respond more. 
Whether or not the member of Congress deviates from his or her equilibrium at the start of the 
session is the issue to be explained.  Because it is binary, we estimate a logit model, where 
positive coefficients indicate a greater likelihood of reacting to a mandate.  The model contains 
the micro-level predictors outlined above and election specific factors.  We include a dummy 
variable indicating whether the member was in the House to control for any differences across 
the chambers.  We use robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity induced by the 
pooling across elections.  The estimates appear in Table 5. 
[Table 5 Here] 
Although the focus of analysis is different -- in Peterson et al. (2003) we modeled mandate 
duration and here we are predicting whether or not a member was affected -- the results for the 
individual level variables are similar.  Members of the mandate party are more likely to respond 
than are out party members.  The change in the member’s margin of victory also matters.  
Members who lose vote share are significantly more likely to deviate from their equilibrium 
voting strategy than members who gain vote share, and the greater the loss, the greater the 
impact.  Seniority, ideological extremity, and a gain in vote margin are not significantly related 
to reacting to a mandate. 
The national level factors shape individual level decision making too, even when we control for 
the individual level influences.  The patterns mirror those of our count models and support 
portions of the two original theories.  The impact of the president’s margin of victory does not 
depend on a change in the party of the presidency.  The remaining variables of interest are all 
significant.  A president from the majority party, a president receiving less than half of the 
popular vote, or a president with a large margin of victory all suppress the likelihood that a 
member reacts.  A change in the party of the presidency, or a gain in either the number of seats 
or the control of the chambers in Congress increases the likelihood that a member will react.  
Finally, the negative influence of electing a minority president is mitigated by the president’s 
party’s status in Congress.  The interaction effect of a minority president and the number of 
chambers controlled by the president’s party is positive and significant, but its magnitude (0.28) 
is substantially smaller than that of the main effect of having a minority president (-1.00).  
Minority presidents suffer in Congress, but they suffer less if their party controls Congress. 
The third column of Table 5 gives some substantive meaning to these results.  Here we report 
explanations of the predicted probability that a member reacts as if a mandate existed.  The 
effects for dichotomous variables are the predicted change in probability between the categories.  
For continuous variables, the effect is the difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
We start our discussion with the member specific predictors which provide a benchmark for 
comparing the effects of the national election-level predictors.  The two statistically significant 
predictors have relatively small effects.  Switching from the disadvantaged party to the mandate 
party increases the probability of responding by 0.09 while the change to a larger decrease in 
victory margin increases the probability of reacting by 0.05.  The national election-level factors 
have more sizable effects.  If the election changed the control of a chamber of Congress, the 
probability that a typical member reacts increases by 0.09.  The hypothetical seat change has an 
even larger effect—the change in seats produces a 0.12 increase in the probability that a typical 
member reacts.  The change in the party of the presidency has the largest effect—increasing the 
probability by 0.14.  Finally, if the election supports the current majority party, members are 
only slightly less likely to respond (a change of -0.06).  The president’s margin of victory also 
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has a modest negative effect (-0.05) on the probability that a member responds.  Overall, the 
pattern is clear: signals of change in the national election results are important predictors of an 
individual member’s decision to respond to the perceived mandate, perhaps more important than 
the signals the member received from his or her own constituents. 
Agenda or Ideology? 
Before concluding, we wish to address one lingering issue.  Our approach to members’ reaction 
assumes that the changes that occur stem from changes in their ideological voting strategies and 
not from the content of the roll call votes they face.  An alternative explanation to the patterns we 
find is that members of Congress are reacting to changes in the policy agenda, and in particular 
the agenda pushed by the President.  The idea that members might respond to the President, or 
the content of a limited number of specific bills is a serious challenge to our theory.  Ultimately, 
we believe, given our measurement strategy, that this alternative explanation is implausible and 
that it is inconsistent with the evidence. 
Our measure of a member of Congress’ reaction to the election is susceptible to changes in the 
Congressional agenda.  Our measurement strategy assumes that the agenda is largely constant—a 
liberal vote at the start of the session is the same as a liberal vote at the end.  If this measurement 
assumption is incorrect, if the agenda changes the content of the roll calls, then the measures of 
Congressional reaction may be biased.  The direction of this bias, however, depends on how the 
agenda shifts during the Congress. 
Consider the most common understanding, that mandate elections produce an early session 
agenda shift in the direction of the mandate.  If, contrary to our theory, member voting strategies 
were then constant, the agenda shift would produce movement away from the mandate in the 
early session, the opposite of both our theoretical claim and our empirical findings.  Agenda shift 
is not a competing explanation then.  It explains not the effects we see, but the opposite. It should 
suppress mandate influence, not account for it. 
The only way that changes in the agenda could drive the effects we observe would be if the 
agenda moved in the opposite direction.  A strategic leadership would have to propose more 
moderate legislation at the start of the session and then become extreme as time progresses.  This 
would require party leaders to forego the advantage of the election for cherished policy goals and 
instead compromise where it would seem unnecessary.  It is much more likely that leaders of the 
party that gained from the election will use the gains to attempt to influence public policy.  They 
will propose legislation that is less moderate not more.  Thus, the measurement scheme may 
create a bias, but it is a conservative one. 
The empirical results present a more forceful answer to agenda change as competing theory.  
Changes in the agenda could produce reactions that might appear to be a reaction to a mandate.  
But the agenda change explanation cannot explain why it is specific members, those who receive 
strong signals from their constituents, who respond.  The results presented here further discredit 
the agenda change explanation.  If it is agenda change in the early session that drives apparent 
mandate effects, these changes should be largely unpredictable across years.  Their magnitude, as 
captured in the number of members who are affected, should not vary with the strength of the 
signal for change found in the election.  While many theories could explain why we see the 
changes in member roll call votes that we do, the only one consistent with both the micro and 
macro level results we present is one that stems from the construction of the meaning of the 
election.  The predictability both of which members alter their voting and in which years 




Our results demonstrate the importance of the policy message members of Congress take from 
election returns.  While scholars may disagree over the possibility of finding a policy mandate in 
election results, given the right circumstances, members of Congress have little difficulty finding 
one.  More importantly, they quickly adjust their behavior to reflect the electoral signal.  For 
some members it is a means of insulating themselves from the changing electoral landscape.  
Their response to the mandate election is an attempt to stave off the possibility of electoral 
defeat.  For others the mandate provides new opportunities to vote their ideological preferences, 
perhaps more brazenly. 
The results also speak to the debate about how members of Congress perceive mandates.  
Members of Congress behave as if a mandate occurred only when election results suggest a 
shifting electorate.  Conley’s argument about mandates is well reasoned and her focus on the 
exchange between the president and Congress is an important step in reconceptualizing and 
testing new theories of electoral mandates.  The results presented here, however, indicate that the 
key mechanism behind change in Congress lies in member perceptions of a changing electoral 
landscape and not in presidential declarations.  Members of Congress attend to and react to 
signals about how well they reflect the changing views of their constituents. 
We conclude with a question: what do these models tell us about the workings of our democracy 
and system of representation?  Dahl (1990), in what is the definitive critique of the standard 
conception of mandates, argues that presidents’ use of mandates is harmful.  The president uses 
rhetoric and executive powers to manipulate public opinion and to influence Congress, 
excessively in Dahl’s view.  The dilemma is that this more democratic presidency has weakened 
the ability of Congress, the body most closely linked to the people, to oversee the president and 
direct policy debates.  Dahl sees a system with less public consideration of candidates and less 
review of elites by their peers.  The mandate claim in this view has emboldened the presidency 
and brought increased conflict with, and domination over, Congress.  This has eroded 
meaningful deliberation, eliminated constructive compromise, and created gridlock. 
The President Driven model of mandates implies precisely these problems.  Illusory support 
creates a weapon that the president can use to force Congress to accept his agenda.  Congress, in 
this depiction essentially abdicates its constitutional role as a balancing institution and merely 
serves to pass the president’s proposals. 
The Public Driven model of mandates suggests a different role for Congress.  Instead of 
capitulating to a powerful president, Congress reflects what it believes are the preferences of the 
electorate.  Congress is then highly responsive; passing measures that it thinks the public 
supports.  While such support may be as illusory as the popularity of the president, the intention 
of members of Congress is to react to the public’s policy preferences.  Mandates, then, are not 
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1960 Democrats 68 19 87 
1962 Democrats 87 13 100 
1964 Democrats 53 25 78 
1966 Republicans 179 29 218 
1968 Republicans 104 10 114 
1970 Democrats 27 28 55 
1972 Republicans 44 28 72 
1974 Democrats 177 27 204 
1976 Democrats 126 17 143 
1978 Republicans 61 18 79 
1980 Republicans 218 39 257 
1982 Democrats 219 38 257 
1984 Republicans 51 23 74 
1986 Democrats 186 27 213 
1988 Republicans 132 17 149 
1990 Democrats 66 33 99 
1992 Democrats 67 38 105 
1994 Republicans 122 40 162 
1996 Democrats 26 21 47 
1998 Republicans 62 25 87 
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Table 2. Number of members affected by mandate, President Driven model 
 (Poisson regression) 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Presidential margin of victory in popular 
vote 
-0.03w 0.004 
President elected less than 50% of popular 
vote 
-0.56* 0.08 
Advantaged party is the majority party -0.23 w  0.04 
Number of chambers of Congress mandate 
party controls 
-0.003 0.02 
Interaction: Number of chambers times 
president received less than 50% of 
popular vote 
0.14 * 0.06 
Constant 5.19* 0.04 
N = 20. 
* indicates p<.05 





Table 3. Number of members affected by mandate, Public Driven model 
 (Poisson regression) 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Presidential margin of victory in popular 
vote 
-0.03* 0.01 
Party of the president changes 0.03 0.08 
Presidential margin of victory in popular 
vote when the party of the president 
changes 
0.06* 0.01 
Number of seats gained by advantaged 
party 
0.01* 0.001 
Chamber of Congress changes party 
control 
0.17* 0.06 
Advantaged Party is the majority party 0.05 0.05 
Constant 4.65* 0.0 
N = 20. 





Table 4. Number of members affected by mandate, Full model 
 (Poisson regression) 
 Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Expected change based on changes 
in Independent variables, CLARIFY 
estimates. 
(Standard error of estimate) 

















Number of chambers of Congress 




Number of chambers * president 









Presidential margin of victory in 




















N = 20.  * indicates p<.05 
Column thee illustrates the expected change in the number of members affected based on changes in 
the value of the independent variable listed and typical values for all other variables.  For all 
dichotomous variables the effect is the expected difference between zero and one for that variable.  
For the continuous variables the effect is between the 25th and 75th percentiles.   









Expected effect, CLARIFY 
estimates.  
(Standard error of estimate) 
Individual level controls   
Ideological extremity -0.01 (0.01) - 
Member is of advantaged party 0.46* (0.05) 0.09 (0.01) 
Seniority 0.001 (0.003) - 
Gain in victory margin 0.06 (0.12) - 
Loss in victory margin -0.43* (0.14) 0.05 (0.02) 
House Member 0.03 (0.07) - 
Electoral factors   
Presidential margin of victory in popular 
vote 
-0.03* (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) 
President elected less than 50% of 
popular vote 
-0.80* (0.19) -0.14 (0.03) 
Advantaged party is the majority party -0.30* (0.06) -0.06 (0.01) 
Number of chambers of Congress 
mandate party controls 
-0.05 (0.03) - 
Number of chambers * president 
received less than 50% of popular vote 
0.20* (0.09) 0.05 (0.02) 
Party of the president changes 0.63* (0.15) 0.14 (0.04) 
Presidential margin of victory in popular 
vote when the party of the president 
changes 
0.004 (0.02) - 
Number of seats gained by advantaged 
party 
0.02* (0.002) 0.12 (0.01) 
Chamber of Congress changes party 
control 
0.42* (0.09) 0.09 (0.02) 
Constant -1.34* (0.019) 0.19 
N = 9432  * indicates p<.05 
Column three illustrates the change in the probability a member will react to the election based on 
changes in the value of the independent variable listed and typical values for all other variables.  
For all dichotomous variables the effect is the expected difference between zero and one for that 
variable.  For the continuous variables the effect is between the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
Based on 1000 simulations of the model. 
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